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· LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 
VERNA C. SANCHEZ* 
In a commencement speech last year, one of our graduates ex­
plained that a friend had asked what she had learned during 
three years in law school. When the graduate mentioned torts, 
contracts, and criminal law, her friend responded, "But where is 
the class about justice?"1 
As individuals and as lawyers, we have all considered the issue 
of what is justice. For those of us who are academics, we are obli­
gated to not only reconsider this question, but to add another. That 
is, our concern must not simply be focused on what justice is and 
what is its relationship to the law and legal system of this country. 
Rather, we must also ask, and try to answer, the question: What do 
we teach about justice and the legal system? To a limited extent, I 
think it is less important what we think about justice, than that we 
do think about it. I say this because it is most often the case that 
the legal academy, like Justicia herself, wears a blindfold. That is, 
the focus of the legal academy is on teaching the law and the rule of 
law. This is not, in and of itself, wrong. What is difficult to explain, 
as the conversation cited above exemplifies, is how, when, and why 
the issue of justice got separated out from the law. How is it that 
one may study three years in law school, read hundreds of cases and 
learn, articulate, and apply an equal number of rules of law without 
ever considering or even hearing mention of justice? "In an earlier 
day, speaking about law and justice was not so vexing or difficult. 
Justice (jus meaning 'law') was a legal term, pure and simple."2 
Thus, expanding my idea that what we, as law professors, think 
about justice may not be as important ·as the obligation that we do 
think about it. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.A., 
1977, Clark University; J.D., 1981, Northeastern University School of Law. 
1. Stephanie M. Wildman, The Quest for Justice: The Rule of Law and Invisible 
Systems of Privilege, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDER· 
MINES AMERICA 139, 139-40 (Stephanie M. Wildman et al. eds., 1996). 
2. Thomas R. Kearns & Austin Sarat, Legal Justice and Injustice: Toward a Situ­
ated Perspective, in JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 1,2 (Austin 
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996) (emphasis added). 
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What is even more critical is that we get our students to think 
about it, at least as often as they are thinking about rules of law. I 
would venture to say that the word "justice" is not often heard (or 
at least not often enough) in law schools, except to refer to 
Supreme Court judges. Too often students are only taught the for­
malistic requirements of legal thought and analysis: brief the case, 
learn the facts, find the issue, find the holding, isolate the rationale 
for the decision, apply it to a hypothetical set of facts. How often 
do they get taught that each case they read is about real people and 
real lives? Do we remind them that beyond the issue and the rule 
in the case, there is a profound impact on one or more people every 
time a court rules? I once used the two Jehovah's Witness flag sa­
lute cases, decided three years apart, in a course for first year stu­
dents.3 But in addition to discussing the facts, issue, and rule of law, 
we also talked about the people involved in the case. We discussed 
and read material about the plaintiffs in Minersville School District 
v. Gobitis ,4 and we also read about what happened in the three 
years between the two cases. As has been well documented, follow­
ing Gobitis, Jehovah's Witnesses all over the country were brutally 
attacked by mobs.5 Many of the students told me they thought it 
was the most meaningful experience they had yet had in law school; 
the recognition that the law is about something beyond formalistic 
and abstract principles to be learned and mastered. Discussion of 
the law and legal analysis ought to include a different kind of "hide 
and seek" than the type usually encouraged in the academy. That 
is, let's also look for and try to find what is not there and see if it 
has had any influence on the outcome. 
Coming back to Gobitis and West Virginia State Board of Edu­
cation v. Barneue6 as examples, it was difficult to explain or justify 
why the Court, in ruling on two cases with virtually identical facts 
and issues, could reach absolutely opposite results,7 if we ignored 
everything beyond the "four corners of the pages" on which the 
3. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Miners­
ville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
4. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
5. See BARBARA GRIZZUTI HARRISON, VISIONS OF GLORY: A HISTORY AND A 
MEMORY OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES 190-91 (1978). 
6. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
7. In Gobitis, the Court upheld the public school expUlsion of two children, Jeho­
vah's Witnesses, who had refused to stand and pledge allegiance to the Hag, because of 
their religious beliefs. See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600. Three years later, on almost the 
exact same facts, the Court reversed itself, on a vote of six to three. See Barnette, 319 
U.S. at 642. 
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opinions were written. Once, however, we read about the repercus­
sions that occurred after Gobitis, of which the Court was aware, we 
could begin to better understand the dynamics of the decision in 
Barnette. The mythology of the "traditionalists" in the academy is 
that the "legal realists" or "critical legal theorists" are seeking, 
inappropriately, to further a political agenda, in a world where, in­
stead, the law is actually decided and taught in a neutral, value-free 
fashion.8 If one operates from the latter perspective, it is then quite 
easy to think about and teach the law without ever considering the 
idea of justice. What is more difficult, however, is to try and make 
meaning out of much that we read and teach. The idea of justice 
can, in the "traditionalist" context, be seen to be absolutely irrele­
vant to the teaching of law. 
It is quite natural that those of us who have historically been 
disenfranchised in so many different ways, as well as those others 
who may have a more inclusive and fuller sense of history than has 
been traditionally taught and discussed, will see things in a way dif­
ferent from the "mainstream" of thought (i.e., through our own 
particular filters or prisms). How do we not think about racial dis­
crimination, for example, in a way that does not include a funda­
mental "in the soul" type of understanding that the next time it 
could be me, or that in the past, in fact, it has been? I would sug­
gest that we need to go even further than simply recognizing the 
effect of one's personal prism on how one views the world. To limit 
ourselves, collectively, to the notion that the "other" will never see, 
or know, or really understand, is to let all of us off too lightly. To 
say, for example, that as a man you can never quite appreciate the 
emotional burden that each woman bears of knowing that simply 
because she is a woman, she is never completely safe from that very 
particular act of violence (i.e., rape) does not and should not pre­
clude the idea that, you, as a man, must join forces in every possible 
way to eliminate such threats-for the collective good. That is, not 
because you may have a sister, daughter, mother, lover, friend, or 
wife who may be affected, but because it should be a societal de­
mand that such a state of constant danger and threat harms us all, 
as a society. 
People of color, women, and gay people are distinct targets of 
8. Jonathan Stubbs has briefly described some "legal realist" views, including 
those of Professor John Gray, who, as Stubbs notes, has asserted that "the real meaning 
of law is what the judges say it is." Jonathan K. Stubbs, Perceptual Prisms and Racial 
Realism: The Good News About a Bad Situation, 45 MERCER L. REv. 773, 782 (1994) 
(citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1921». 
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the burgeoning threat of hate groups. Numerous scholars have laid 
out the extent of this threat.9 But what must also be understood is 
how such groups represent a threat to us all, as a society, not simply 
to some of us within society. There is little chance of genuine jus­
tice being achieved in a climate of fear. The perception problem, of 
course, goes back to the idea of the prism, derived from Professor 
Jonathan Stubbs's article.lO If it is not in my personal "reality," the 
thinking often goes, then I need not make an effort to try and look 
at it from another's perspective and understand what is so threaten­
ing and harmful to that other person. Or worse yet, there is often 
not even a consciousness or awareness that "I" am operating from a 
particular perspective derived exclusively from my own life experi­
ence. How often have you heard a woman say: "I don't consider 
myself a feminist, because I've never been discriminated against; I 
don't understand why these women are complaining; they need to 
just pull themselves up by their own bootstraps"? There is an un­
questioned assumption that "my" reality is everyone else's reality 
(or at least should be). 
Why don't all Americans feel strongly about the threat posed 
by hate groups? Perhaps it is because when one does not feel indi­
vidually threatened, then one need not be concerned that others 
may be. Further, there is a failure to see that such a threat to others 
is, in and of itself, a threat to all.H It is the same type of thinking 
that leads to the complaints about procedural and other legal pro­
tections given to criminal defendants. The notion is that "this will 
never affect me, and so the protection offered to someone else, here 
a criminal, has no value for me and never will. I receive no benefit 
from such protection, and therefore, it is wrong for society to ex­
tend such a benefit to others, particularly to such unworthy peo­
ple." This thinking is founded on an idea of the absolute primacy of 
the individual over the community, which goes hand in hand 
(although it is not clear which came first) with the "sanctity" of pri­
vate property. Beyond this, of course, are those people who, while 
not willing to join such groups as the Order or the Klan, in fact 
condone or endorse (although in practice this may be a distinction 
9. See, e.g., Robin Barnes, Standing Guard for the P. C. Militia, or, Fighting Hatred 
and Indifference: Some Thoughts on Expressive Hate-Conduct and Political Correctness, 
1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 979; Marl J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consider­
ing the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989). 
10. See Stubbs, supra note 8. 
11. "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 79 (1963). 
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without a difference) the ideas articulated by these groups. How 
can it be that not everyone sees what to many of us is quite clear: 
that these groups represent a clear and present danger? 
It is an interesting exercise to read the papers and listen to the 
news reporting the racial violence occurring in Germany (even the 
European papers seem to happily lick their lips with an "I told you 
so" smirk almost seeping out of each new report of violence). 
There are indisputably sound historical reasons for being concerned 
about the rise of Neo-Nazis and racist skinhead groups in that coun­
try, but that is not my point in raising this issue. There is probably 
little disagreement in this country as to whether or not it was right 
and proper for the German government to have banned Nazi sym­
bols, such as the swastika, as it has done. It would seem that people 
have agreed that this should be so-the swastika, for example, be­
cause of its appropriation by the Nazis, has become a symbol of a 
terrible and violent past,12 and to ban it is quite proper for that 
reason. And, of course, the German government should and must 
"go after" these groups, as quickly and emphatically as possible. 
Ban them, punish them, and make sure they never again have the 
power to put their ideas into practice. 
But now let us look at our own country for a moment. Why 
does this government accept the public display of the Confederate 
flag? It is a symbol of sedition and racial violence, with a profound 
and bloody history attached to it. How is it that this symbol has 
defenders, and what is the basis of such a defense? Given the his­
tory surrounding the Confederacy, not only as a breakaway govern­
ment, but also the bloody legacy attached to the maintenance of 
slavery or slave-like conditions post-Civil War, why is it that not 
everyone can see the offensive and oppressive nature represented 
by this flag? Don't we, in this country, also have a bloody history of 
genocide and oppression, and therefore a historically sound basis 
for doing something comparable to what the German government 
has done? It has to do, again, with perceptions and "prisms." What 
we see in others goes unnoticed in ourselves. 1 raise these questions 
less as a means of suggesting one absolute correct answer, but 
rather to suggest that, as a society, we ought to be talking about 
them. 1 believe there is a connection between these ideas of the 
12. The swastika is a very ancient symbol which has been used by various peoples 
and cultures throughout the world. See, e.g., MIRANDA BRUCE-MITFORD, THE ILLUS· 
TRATED BOOK OF SIGNS & SYMBOLS 21,105 (1996); 18 ACADEMIC AMERICAN ENCY­
CLOPEDIA 379 (1995); 26 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 91 (Int'l ed. 1996). 
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need for genuine self-reflection and inclusive dialogues, and those 
of justice-defining it and trying to achieve it. 
I suggest that the problem here is not of the loss of an Ameri­
can ethos, but instead, the absence of one.13 Because of the 
supremacy of the individual (how often have you heard expressed 
the idea that it is precisely the individualism of this nation that 
makes it great?), there cannot be a complete and true ethos. At 
least part of the problem would appear to be that this society too 
often seems to embrace an ahistorical and incomplete view of the 
world. In doing so, we never have to consider the possibility that 
what is true for us as individuals may not be true for others, 
whether that means others in our own country, or elsewhere in the 
world. The individual prism does not have to expand to include the 
idea that there are other experiences, cultures, and values that must 
be accounted for. But as Gabriel Garcia Marquez said when he 
accepted the Nobel Prize for Literature: "The interpretation of our 
reality through patterns not our own serves only to make us ever 
more unknown, ever less free, ever more solitary."14 The hostility 
which has greeted recent works of "revisionist" history, which have 
simply attempted to set forth a more complete and inclusive re­
telling of what happened and when, is consistent with a myopic 
view of the world and one's place in it, as a person or as a nation. 
Indeed, referring to this country as "America" is also an example of 
this narrowness of vision. The United States of America is only one 
part of one of the Americas-there are, we should remember, a 
North, South, and Central America. 
There are so many words that we come across each day which 
have become loaded with negative implications. The words we use, 
and the tone with which we speak them, send very clear signals 
about what is valuable, respected, and worthy, and conversely, what 
is not. The words "idealism" or "idealist," for example, whether 
written or spoken, are often used in a way that seems to carry with 
them an implicit sneer. But what we say in this context, and how 
we say it, may of course reflect what we think about justice and the 
law and the relationship between the two. As lawyers, we are ac­
customed to seeing the standard, once-a-year article in the ABA 
Journal (or comparable professional publication) about those law­
13. See Reginald L. Robinson, The Impact of Hobbes's Empirical Natural Law on 
Title VII's Effectiveness: A Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV. 607 (1993). 
14. Gabriel Garda Marquez, The Solitude of Latin America, in GABRIEL GARCIA 
MARQUEZ AND THE POWERS OF FICI"ION 87, 89 (Julio Ortega ed. & Marina Castaileda 
trans., 1988). 
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yers who practice public interest law. The article is usually written 
in a way that makes it apparent that, overall, these people are aber­
rant but interesting "specimens." The "idealist" of course, is al­
ways juxtaposed against the "pragmatist." In fact, the pragmatist is 
usually meant to be what an idealist becomes when he or she 
"grows up." That is, work that carries with it a goal of attaining a 
common good or betterment of society is a sign of immaturity-a 
stage, perhaps, to be gotten through until one achieves "good 
sense" and moves on. But it is the idealist, I contend, who worries 
most about questions of justice: do we have it, does the law consider 
it or offer it, can we get it, and if so, ~ow? 
It seems clear that there is no real consensus about what justice 
means.15 Some have argued that justice is an elusive, philosophical 
idea. Even if this is so, society can only benefit by continued debate 
and discussion about it. We are harmed, within the academy and 
without, by turning away from, or benignly neglecting the topic. 
But ours is a society that seems to have moved further and further 
away from respecting ideas or the life of the mind. Instead, we are 
fed "sound bites," a meager substitute for genuine intellectual ex­
change within and among the polity. Abstract concepts and the 
realm of ideas have been almost completely superseded by 
"thi1J,gs." The extension of this perspective is that anything can be 
bought and sold. And we all remember that our own history in­
cludes a time when some peoples were indeed treated only as com­
modities. How can we attempt to achieve justice when there may 
be so little interest in discussing or thinking about it? 
When you have a society that has connected up the idea of 
freedom or liberty with ownership and the pursuit of "things," then 
the right of the individual emerges as paramount to the right of the 
community. It becomes ever more difficult to try and persuade 
people of the intrinsic value of a just society when you may not be 
able to offer tangible proof of the benefits, especially for each indi­
vidual person. This explains why we have seen such a distortion of 
the constitutional right to bear anus. This "right," taken totally out 
of any historical or constitutional context, has ended up being trans­
lated into the idea that society has absolutely no right to try to limit 
the number or type of guns one can purchase each month, or assert 
15. See generally JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, supra 
note 2. Is justice simply the absence of injustice? Or is it, as Justinian stated it, "the set 
and constant purpose which gives to every man his due?" CAESAR FLAVIUS JUSTINIAN, 
THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 3 (J.B. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913). 
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that there might be a legitimate reason to ban certain types of 
weapons, such as assault rifles. We hear the refrain, chanted like a 
mantra that, "It's my right as an American to ...." What is really 
meant is that it is my absolute right as an individual to be free from 
any restraint, irrespective of the impact of that idea on society as a 
whole. 
It is quite easy, then, to see why law professors and law stu­
dents can spend three years together, discussing hundreds of rules 
of law and cases, and never once utter the word "justice" except as 
a reference to a judge. Or why one can spend an entire career prac­
ticing law and litigating without ever trying to consciously achieve, 
attain, or define justice. I am not arguing that justice requires that 
the individual should always, and at all costs, be subverted by the 
community. We all know, through the lessons of world history, the 
dangers implicit in that conclusion. And for those of us whose his­
tories include having been subjected to slavery, or disenfranchise­
ment, or a legacy of poverty and colonialism, there is an 
understandable reluctance to urge the adoption of an absolute pref­
erence for the community over the individual. We know that, more 
often than not, "we" are not included in the definition of "commu­
nity," but rather, are left to be affected by what the community de­
cides. What I suggest here, instead, is that the problems of fairness 
and equality, for example, cannot be resolved without at least an 
acknowledgement of the need for a meaningful ethos that tries to 
balance the needs of both the individual and the community in a 
way that benefits both and advances the cause of justice. I am re­
minded of an excerpt of a speech given by another Nobel Prize win­
ner. Albert Camus was speaking of the artist, but I believe that we 
may take his words and substitute ourselves, as lawyers, law stu­
dents, or law professors, but also, and above all, as members of a 
larger community: 
At the same time, after having outlined the nobility of the 
writer's craft, I should have put him in his proper place. He has 
no other claims but those which he shares with his comrades in 
arms: vulnerable but obstinate, unjust but impassioned for jus­
tice, doing his work without shame or pride in view of everybody, 
not ceasing to be divided between sorrow and beauty, and de­
voted finally to drawing from his double existence the creations 
that he obstinately tries to erect in the destructive movement of 
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history.16 
I believe it is our obligation, as professors, lawyers, and law 
students, to seek justice when and how we can. We must teach jus­
tice, talk about it, write about it, and work for it, so that all of us 
may come to desire it, recognize the need for it and the benefit 
derived from it, and therefore possibly make it real, always. 
16. Albert Camus, Acceptance Speech, in NOBEL PRIZE LIBRARY: ALBERT 
CAMUS, WINSTON CHURCHILL 7, 9-10 (1971). 
